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Abstract  
Many economic historians agree that increased labour inputs contributed to Britain’s 
primary industrialisation. Voluntary self-exploitation by workers to purchase new consumer 
goods is one common explanation, but it sits uneasily with evidence of poverty, child labour, 
popular protest, and criminal punishments explored by social historians.  A critical and 
neglected legal dimension may be the evolution of contracts of employment. The law of master 
and servant, to use the technical term, shifted markedly between 1750 and 1850 to advantage 
capital and disadvantage labour.  Medieval in origin, it had always been adjudicated in 
summary hearings before lay magistrates, and provided penal sanctions to employers 
(imprisonment, wage abatement, and later fines), while giving workers a summary remedy for 
unpaid wages.  The law always enforced obedience to employers’ commands, suppressed 
strikes, and tried to keep wages low.  Between 1750 and 1850 it became more hostile to workers 
through legislation and judicial redefinition; its enforcement became harsher through 
expansion of imprisonment, capture of the local bench by industrial employers, and employer 
abuse of written contracts. More work in manuscript sources is needed to test the argument, 
but it seems likely that intensification of labour inputs during industrialisation was closely tied 
to these legal changes. 
Acknowledgements: Thanks to Eric Tucker (York University, Law), Marc Steinberg (Smith 
College, Sociology), Simon Deakin (Cambridge University, Law) and Jane Humphries 
(Oxford University, Emeritus Economic History), Deb Oxley (Oxford, Social Science History), 
and Judy Stephenson (Oxford, Economic History), and to Ben Schneider and other members 
of the Oxford Labour Economic History Group, for questions and suggestions on earlier 
versions. Errors are mine.  The present  paper originated in one given at the Economic and 
Social Science Council seminar on Labour Markets in Industrialization, All Souls, Oxford, 12 
Jan 2006. 
Keywords: coercion, contract of employment, labour law, industriousness, punishment, work 
time 
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Introduct ion  
In recent decades economic historians have been abandoning a half-century of research 
in national income estimates by which they had hoped to explain why Britain was the first 
society to undergo an industrial revolution (Mokyr 2004: 1-27; de Vries 1994: 251).1 Once the 
weakness of the main statistical series—including the invisibility of huge numbers of female 
and child workers (Hoppit 1990; Berg and Hudson 1992; Berg 1993; Humphries and Horrell 
1995) —became apparent, two other approaches were tried. One is an elaboration of an old 
explanation: intellectual, technological and institutional change (Mokyr 2017, 2009, 2009a, 
2008, 1998, 1990). We revisit the Royal Society and the inventors (Watt, Arkwright, 
Wedgwood, a host of less-known men), their machines and technical knowledge (spinning 
machines, steam engines, new ceramics), and the legal order (patents, contracts, ‘the rule of 
law’). The second approach is an argument by Jan de Vries that an ‘industrious revolution’, an 
intensification of labour inputs, created a market for new consumer goods and new industries, 
as workers and their families voluntarily worked much longer hours to obtain them (de Vries 
2008, 1994, 1993).  But did law have anything to do with the first industrial revolution, beyond 
‘rule of law’: secure property protection, patents, and contracts?  Master and servant law, that 
rather peculiar and coercive form of contract law, seems likely to be important. My argument 
is that its punishments, described below, likely contributed greatly to the growth of labour 
inputs said to be crucial to industrialization, an intensification demonstrated by the work of 
Hans-Joachim Voth and others (Voth 2001, 2000; Horrell 2014; Allen and Weisdorf 2011; 
Humphries, Horrell, Voth 2001). 
I .  Work ing Time  
Coercive labour contracts are ignored by these economic historians. The main exponent 
of an ‘industrious’ revolution argues that ‘The intensification of work and suppression of 
leisure was associated with the (self) exploitation of family members—wives and children...’ 
There developed ‘the industrious disposition.’ ‘With the right incentives, a large amount of 
extra output could be squeezed out of the pre-industrial technological complex’ (de Vries 1994: 
260, 262; de Vries 1993: 114). ‘Incentives’ suggests encouragements to voluntary labour; 
‘squeezing’, something darker. Hints of forces other than happy market exchanges do appear: 
                                                 
 
 
1 But see Broadberry et al. 2015 for a synthesis and summary of recent research.   
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moralists justifying the subordination of feckless workers, the ‘imperious’ demands of the new 
factories (said to be rare before 1800), poverty, larger families, taxes, and new technologies 
(de Vries 1994: 258; de Vries 1993: 110.) But the main conclusion is that ‘acquisitive or 
maximizing behaviour, understood in the context of its time, was not alien and “unnatural”, 
and, hence, was not imposed in the main by political force on a dispossessed and victimized 
labour force (de Vries 1993: 116-7, my emphasis).’ Peasant households voluntarily chose 
labour over leisure. Land-poor households produced consumer commodities; those with more 
land ‘poured household labour into the production of such labour-intensive and utterly market-
oriented crops as tobacco, wine, hops and madder (de Vries 1993: 110-13).’ This summary of 
important work by Joan Thirsk and others on home production from the seventeenth century 
made me think of other places, notably Britain’s colonies. From the 1600s to the 1830s 
Virginian tobacco, and other ‘labour-intensive and utterly market-oriented crops’ from the 
Caribbean to Mauritius, were produced by involuntary labour:  slaves suffering extraordinary 
coercion.2 
    What of England itself? Voth’s estimates suggest an extraordinary intensification of 
work at the heart of empire during industrialization. Not longer workdays but rather more days 
per week and per year are held responsible, as traditional holidays and ‘St Monday’ (when 
workers made that day a holiday) disappeared. The work week grew from roughly 5 to roughly 
6 days, an increase between 1760 and 1830 of +550 to +654 hours per year, or 14% to 32%; 
most of the increase possibly happened by 1800 (Voth 2000: Fig. 3.15, 132 and preceding 
pages). 3 Voth argues that this huge increase of labour inputs was peculiar to the first industrial 
revolution: other industrial economies that underwent transformations later had much lower 
                                                 
 
 
2 The absence of Empire seems strange in a modelling of Britain’s economic growth. This is true also of Voth 
(2000): he assumes that the output of colonial possessions, especially plantation agriculture, and the size of the 
imperial market for British manufactures, had nothing to do with the performance of the British economy (e.g. 
the theoretical discussion of the ‘internal market’ at 261, 265.) In a comparison of England with other economies 
he notes in passing (but with no reference to British imperial plantation agriculture) the salience of large labour 
inputs for coffee and bananas (245). Yet if the vast growth of low-cost slave and indentured labour in the Empire 
had anything to do with British economic growth, it seems odd to omit it, and more recent work suggests its 
importance. The Empire illustrates many aspects of master and servant law and its place in economic growth, 
including highly exploitative contracts immediately after slavery and again in the later nineteenth century (Hay 
and Craven 2004).  
3 Recent estimates suggest real wage rates declined 3.6% 1750-1800 while GDP per head increased 19.6%, as 
work hours lengthened: Broadberry et al 2015, 263, 276-8. See Humphries and Weisdorf forthcoming for a 
reconstruction of wage rates 1260-1850 from a huge new range of contemporary sources; they show increasing 
labour input over a longer period, intensifying  during the run-up to industrialization, while being agnostic about 
possible causes. 
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labour inputs, a fact which he ascribes to the disadvantages (for British workers) of being first. 
He has less to say about how increased labour was secured. After rejecting a wide range of 
possibilities,4 he simply says that we must ‘focus on the institutional preconditions such as the 
legal system that helped to establish a routine of ‘dawn-to-dusk’ schedules.’ And suddenly 
(contrasting Weber’s Protestant Ethic) he adds that this ‘would shift the emphasis from 
religious sects, where additional work was “voluntary”, to state-driven intervention in 
economies as a whole, where additional work was often forced upon an unwilling population.’ 
For England in this period was a case of ‘Stalinist growth’, state-directed (Voth 2000: 228-29, 
271).5 How, and why, is unexplained. 
     Subsequent work suggests that an ‘industrious’ explanation may indeed explain 
some of the intensified labour by higher-paid male workers: their consumption and emulation 
increased demand (Humphries, Horrell, Voth 2001).   The analysis does not consider the 
possible effects of the use of the law to break strikes (see below) and such workers were in any 
case a minority. Industrialization created or expanded a large pool of poorly paid child and 
female labour in factories and in rural industry, as well as low-wage agricultural and industrial 
male employment. So far the economic historians have remained remarkably incurious about 
the terms of the contracts between all these workers and those who employed them, and how 
those contracts were enforced.   
 
II .  Master  and Servant Law  
The law of the contract of employment in England—what the lawyers called the law of 
master and servant—dated back to 1349, if not before, when imprisonment was enacted to 
punish workers in breach of contract. From this time it was enforced summarily by the newly 
emerging figure of the lay justice of the peace, who heard and disposed of such disputes in a 
                                                 
 
 
4  His approach is entirely based on inference from estimated curves of supply and demand; his conclusion is that 
‘changes in labour supply were probably responsible for the largest part of the increase in labour input.’ As causes 
he considers and rejects as inadequate explanations nutrition, faster population growth and its pressure on 
consumption, reductions in illness, urbanization, illegitimacy, and a decline of social authority because the decline 
of St Monday would suggest an increase in regard for authority. This last suggestion is based on a rather simplistic 
equation of St Monday with ‘revelry and slothfulness’, but takes us a little closer to the issues of conflict in 
employment contracts. 
5 The only example given is from eighteenth-century Austria (274).  
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highly informal way. Penal sanctions were carried over to the Elizabethan Statute of Artificers 
(1562), the foundation of employment law until the nineteenth century.6  It was supplemented 
by another 26 statutes to 1800, and another 27 to 1875 covering apprentices and almost every 
kind of adult worker, on annual hirings, written contracts (covenants), day labour, and piece 
work. Breach of contract by the worker could be punished by loss of some wages, but the 
statutes also markedly expanded criminal sanctions.7  Breach of contract included leaving the 
master, working for another master without permission, leaving work unfinished, refusing to 
enter into contracted work, refusing to obey orders, and indiscipline of every kind—from poor 
work to sauciness to immoral behavior by a house servant.8   Until the final repeal of the power 
of magistrates to fine in 1875, breach of contract by a worker could result in penal sanctions: 
fine, imprisonment (for failing to give security), and until 1867 imprisonment (with a possible 
whipping) of one to three months for the breach itself (Hay 2000; Hay 2004: 66-67, 82-91; 
Frank 2010; Steinfeld 1991, 2001). From the early nineteenth century the courts also enforced 
a new (or rediscovered) doctrine of ‘entire contract’—no wages were owing until the end of 
the contract, and breach, even near the very end, led to loss of all wages for the entire period 
(see below). In Canada, imprisonment for breach continued into the early twentieth century 
(Hay and Craven 2004: ch 5). In many British colonies it lasted even longer, in jails equipped 
with treadmills, together with provisions for caning and other criminal punishments (Hay and 
Craven 2004: passim). 
My argument is that during the classic first industrial revolution in England, master and 
servant law, not only by parliamentary enactment, but also through judicial interpretation, and 
magisterial enforcement, changed in favour of capital. It gave employers the means to compel 
workers to work harder, longer, and with greater regularity. In his classic article on disciplining 
workers in the industrial revolution through a revolution in managerial techniques, Sidney 
Pollard observed ‘The capitalist employer became a supervisor of every detail of the work: 
without any change in the general character of the wage contract, the employer acquired new 
powers which were of great social significance.’ (Pollard 1963: 259, quoting Kerr et al. 1962: 
193, my emphasis). Without discounting the importance of the carrots, sticks, and attempts at 
moral reformation described in detail by Pollard, on this crucial point he, and Kerr et al., were 
                                                 
 
 
6 5 Eliz. c.4 (often cited as 1563, when it was enacted).  
7 Below, “Serving time”. 
8 Confusingly, domestic servants were not always within the master and servants statutes in the nineteenth century 
(Hay and Craven 2004: 66-67, 88-91). 
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wrong.9  Moreover, many of the coercive techniques Pollard describes took place ‘in the 
shadow of the law’— even when not formally invoked, the threat of legal coercion profoundly 
conditions the behaviour of parties who know it can be used.  An employer’s factory rules 
might impose fines for absence; behind his rules lay his power to have a magistrate impose 
three months’ imprisonment for the same offence. 
 Master and servant legislation had always provided imprisonment for resistant or 
demanding workers, but the regime now became harsher. Bosses used it to control the demands 
of high-wage workers, not least by crushing strikes—workers on strike left work unfinished, 
in breach of contract. Master and servant law was equally useful to discipline low-wage 
workers, including large drafts of women and children in new textile factories, through the 
threat and reality of imprisonment. Perhaps not ‘Stalinist’, the law increasingly aided capital’s 
drive to intensify labour input and hence profits.10 The legislation increased in punitiveness 
(see below). There were equally significant changes in judicial decisions—which in a common 
law system can change the law—and in enforcement.  
III .  Dinner Time:  Workers  and  Judges  
In the famous slavery case, Stewart v Somerset (1772), Serjeant Dunning, arguing for 
the proposition that slavery was the law of England, suggested that it was equally important to 
secure by law the obedience of servants as well as slaves: 
It would be a great surprise, and some inconvenience, if a foreigner bringing over a 
servant, as soon as he got hither, must take care of his carriage, his horse, and himself, 
in whatever method he might have the luck to invent. He must find his way to London 
on foot. Helpless [without] his servant, ‘Do this’ [he says]; the servant replies, ‘Before 
I do it, I think fit to inform you, sir, the first step on this happy land sets all men on a 
perfect level; you are just as much obliged to obey my commands.’ Thus neither 
superior, or inferior; both go without their dinner (Lofft 12, 98 ER 506, my emphasis).11 
                                                 
 
 
9 Pollard did note the continuing significance of miners’ bonds, and their use in other trades in the north-east, and 
there is one mention, with no discussion, of breach of contract: Pollard 1963: 262, 265.  See also Pollard 1965: 
181ff. 
10 Steinberg 2016 argues that master and servant directly contradicts the argument (Polanyi 1944) that free markets 
were wholly disembedded from legal impositions during industrialisation. Orth 1998 argues that master and 
servant inspired changes in general contract law, rather than the reverse.  
11 Lofft 12, 98 ER 506, my emphasis. 
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Dinner looms large in employment cases, for a variety of reasons: definitions of hirings, issues 
of obedience and discipline, and (I argue) because the judges were subtly changing the 
definitions of the relations of master and servant in the early years of the nineteenth century.  
Master and servant law was enforced overwhelmingly by lay magistrates, not judges, and 
magistrates recorded outcomes in private memoranda, if at all. It was the high court judges who 
interpreted and thereby changed the law. The employment cases that came before them almost 
always arose as poor law cases about settlement. A hiring of a year or more gave a settlement 
to the servant (meaning the parish was responsible for her/his support if the servant later needed 
poor relief), and a general hiring (for which much of the law reached back to the Statute of 
Artificers, or beyond) also gave the master complete control of the servant’s time. Explicit 
exceptions to such control in the contract meant no settlement, but in 1818 Lord Chief Justice 
Ellenborough observed that otherwise settlement resulted: 
There is in every contract of hiring some implied except[ion] of hours for relaxation, 
food, and rest; I cannot at least suggest to myself any contract in which such exceptions 
do not exist. The master here has a right to the service of the pauper at all times, but he 
does not require his services at any other hours than those mentioned... 
Mr Justice Bayley concurred, pointing out that when not specifically set out, such issues were 
‘left by the custom of the particular trade to be raised by implication (R v The inhabitants of 
All Saints Worcester: 1 B&A 322, 106 ER 119).’12  
The custom of the trade (or ‘custom of the country’ in agricultural occupations) had for 
centuries been an enforceable part of the contract, if proved in court, or, as in this case, simply 
presumed by the judges to be part of the contract. The right of the master to obedience ‘at all 
times’ was enforceable under master and servant law.13 The case, like others in this period, 
confirmed the totality of the employer’s authority, including the right to determine when he ate 
dinner, absent express language. But an equally strong principle in master and servant law was 
that hiring contracts (notably the ‘general hiring’) could only be ended with the agreement of 
a magistrate. Even in cases of disobedience, the master was not free simply to dismiss the 
servant. To do so would be to act as a judge in his or her own case. The master also owed duties 
to the servant, as the servant did to the master. The master owed the servant not only wages for 
                                                 
 
 
12 For a discussion of other exception cases see Deakin 2001: 15-17.  
13 Ellenborough extended the scope of the law to ‘labourers of every class’, even to independent contractors: 
Lowther v. Earl Radnor and another (1806), 8 East 113; 103 ER 287. 
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time served, but care in sickness, until the end of the annual hiring (Hay and Craven 2004: 
111ff). 
High court judges in the early decades of the nineteenth century encountered the custom of 
dinner hours and other amenities (what came to be called labour standards) fairly often. The 
reported cases strongly suggest that they undercut those standards, and strengthened the 
disciplinary powers of employers. 14 Judges increasingly took the view that the work day had 
to be intensified, rest and meal times cut, instant obedience secured. Their decisions marked 
changes in both the law and judicial attitudes. Perhaps even more important is how these cases 
were reported, absorbed into the professional literature of the law, and eventually understood 
by justices of the peace and borough justices—the lay magistrates who enforced the law. Many 
cases can be cited; among them are Robinson v Hindman (1800), R v Hoseason (1811), Spain 
v Arnott (1817), Lilley v Elwin (1844). All concerned waggoners’ dinners in harvest time, and 
they are examples, for the purposes of this paper, of a much wider range of cases that changed 
master and servant law.  
Failure to work at harvest had always been punished by heavier penalties. The year’s 
produce was at risk of weather; all servants had to participate. The relevant statute law (5 Eliz 
c.4 (1562) s 22) was printed in all the JP handbooks.15 Servants not turning up were likely to 
be sentenced by JPs to imprisonment in the house of correction (Hay 1998: 39; Hay and Craven 
2004: 99). Waggoners were particularly crucial to the smooth operation of reaping and stacking 
the harvest.16 
Hoseason was an unsuccessful attempt at prosecution in King’s Bench, the highest criminal 
court, of a Norfolk justice of the peace (Hay 1998: 40-44 for sources). Hoseason, the JP, had 
assaulted his own servant for trying to take a full hour for dinner, convicted him of disobedience 
and sentenced him to a month’s imprisonment and a whipping, which he insisted be carried 
out. Lord Ellenborough criticized Hoseason for being judge in his own cause, and gave the 
plaintiff costs, but refused to allow a prosecution because friends and fellow-JPs testified that 
                                                 
 
 
14 The duty to care for the servant in sickness also came under attack in the early nineteenth-century English courts 
(Tomlins 1988: 397ff).  
15 It provided that to prevent loss at harvest magistrates and constables could compel artificers and labourers ‘to 
serve by the day for the mowing, reaping, shearing, setting or inning of corn, grain and hay, according to the skill 
and quality of the person’; refusal to be punished by two days and a night in the stocks and a negligent constable 
to be fined forty shillings.  
16 Information in 2005 from Mr Vivian Church of Northampton and Dolanog, UK, farmer and former agricultural 
instructor. 
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they too would have convicted and given the same sentence. They also cited the ‘peculiar state 
of the labouring part of the inhabitants’ of East Anglia (they were getting insolent), and Luddite 
machine-breaking, which began a few months earlier not far away. Ellenborough’s 
determination to protect JPs like Hoseason from legal harassment was also a long-standing 
practice of the high court (Hay 2002). What I want to remark here is the emphasis on labour 
discipline, including time.  
For this case was also about dinner. The testimony of Generel [sic] Batterbee, the abused 
waggoner, was that he was hired (probably by verbal agreement) for six weeks of harvesting, 
at ‘18 shillings a week and a quart of beer a day, and to board himself.’ On 3 September 1811 
he went to work at the usual hour of 6am, and worked until 12 when he had dinner, ‘at which 
meal it was usual for all the men to take an hour.’ The bailiff told him to cut it short, ‘as the 
men on the stack were waiting’; he refused, having had barely half an hour and still eating.   Or 
so Batterbee swore; the bailiff in his affidavit swore rather that Batterbee had finished, was 
sitting idle, his cart obstructed other carts, and that 
the labourers during the time they are carrying corn are not accustomed to consume an 
hour at their dinner but return to their work as soon as they have eaten their meal and 
taken their beer but the said General Batterbee positively refused to obey this Deponent 
and continued to sit saying he would get up when he was ready. 
He swore that he gave Batterbee a gentle nudge with his foot. Batterbee swore that as he was 
getting up the bailiff ‘kicked him very severely on the breech, ... struck ...[him] with his fist on 
his...head, and then took hold of him and threw him down between two wheat stacks, and again 
kicked him on the breech when he was down.’ When Batterbee was brought before Hoseason, 
the employer/magistrate struck him in the face. It is worth noting that before the constable took 
Batterbee off to Swaffham House of Correction to be imprisoned and whipped, Hoseason paid 
him for the work already done.17 The magistrate swore he would have so punished any servant, 
not just his own, who behaved thus during harvest season.  
Batterbee’s affidavit did not give detailed evidence about dinner, beyond that ‘it was usual’ 
to take an hour; he may not have thought it necessary to do so. The Statute of Artificers 5 Eliz. 
c.4 (1562), s.12 provided that artificers and labourers hired by day or week should work from 
5am to 7 or 8pm, and have at most two and a half hours a day for ‘breakfast, dinner, or 
drinking’: ‘that is to say, at every drinking one half hour, for his dinner one hour, and for his 
sleep when he is allowed to sleep, the which is from the midst of May to the midst of August, 
                                                 
 
 
17 See the next case. 
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half an hour at the most, and at every breakfast one half hour.’ Although this was a maximum 
specified for day labourers, this standard came to be expected as the minimum, for day 
labourers but also for servants hired by the year. It was sanctified by the ‘custom of the 
country’, the implied terms of labour contracts, which also had the force of law.  
Six years later dinner featured in what became a leading case. Spain v Arnott (1817), 
heard before Lord Ellenborough sitting alone, is usually cited as the authority for the 
nineteenth-century doctrine of the entire contract: that no wages were due, even for months of 
work already performed, if a servant failed to complete the contract (Hay and Craven 2004: 
113n202; Deakin 2001: 21-22).18 The usefulness in labour discipline of the entire contract 
doctrine is evident, and in fact it became most important in the United States, which rejected 
imprisonment, the common punishment in England, for breach of contract (Steinfeld 1991: 
149-52; Steinfeld 2001: 291-97). Spain v Arnott was interpreted to give masters an absolute 
right of dismissal for disobedience, making the doctrine of entire contract hugely important.  
The case was actually between Jonathan Spain, a waggoner, and Henry Harnett (not 
Arnott, as reported), the Middlesex farmer who hired him at servant’s wages (they had agreed 
10 guineas for the year) for the year commencing 29 Sept 1816.19 But on 21 July Harnett turned 
Spain off (or Spain quit). Spain had been out with the team from 6am until 2pm, wanted his 
dinner, and was told by Harnett, who himself ‘had had his ale’, to first take the waggon to the 
marsh, a mile away. Spain insisted on dinner, Harnett replied that he could leave the premises 
if he did not do as he was told, and Spain left. The published report leaves out some of this 
detail, concentrating instead on Ellenborough’s dicta: that the master could dismiss the servant 
without going to a magistrate, and that the failure to obey meant that Jonathan Spain was owed 
nothing for the time he had already worked (wages beyond board were usually paid at the end 
of the year). Counsel suggested this was a harsh outcome, losing ten months’ wages for what 
was (according to testimony) a lapse by a man who ‘worked hard and did his duty’ with no 
other complaint against him. Ellenborough conceded, ‘it may be hard upon the servant, but it 
                                                 
 
 
18  Older roots can be found in sixteenth-century abridgements and seventeenth-century JPs’ handbooks, but the 
only eighteenth-century high court evidence for it appears to be an angry comment by Viner, author of one of the 
leading abridgements, that the judge at Guildhall nisi prius had ignored the doctrine when Viner attempted to use 
it against one of his own servants: Worth v Viner (1746), (Viner 1791-1794: viii, 8-9). This is actually Viner's 18 
June 1747 letter to Sir John Strange (counsel against him) requesting a copy of the case so that he can print it in 
his Abridgement, and his comments on the case, to the effect that the old books (he cites Brooke, etc) and all 
subsequent reports do not allow for apportionment on an agreement for a year's service. 
19 Notebooks of Edward Law, 1st Baron Ellenborough,  Chief Justice of the King's Bench 1802-1818 (microform 
copy, Osgoode Hall Law School Library), Trin 1817. 
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would be exceedingly inconvenient if the servant were permitted to set himself up to control 
his master in his domestic regulations, such as the time of dinner. After a refusal on the part of 
the servant to perform his work, the master is not bound to keep him on as a burthensome and 
useless servant to the end of the year.... the question really comes to this, whether the master 
or the servant is to have the superior authority.’   
Custom was not specifically pleaded in either this case or in Hoseason, which meant 
that the judges did not have to deal with the issue. Other cases (below) suggest they would have 
made short shrift of it. The case also made clear for the first time that a master faced with what 
he considered disobedience was entitled to dismiss the servant without adjudication by a JP.  
Yet Spain v Arnott (Harnett) is a curious case. It was not reported in the press, perhaps 
because it was a Middlesex nisi prius case, heard by a single judge. A juror was withdrawn by 
consent, and hence no formal verdict entered: this was done when a winning party was willing 
to pay his own costs, but it also meant that the judgement could be regarded as much less 
compelling as a precedent.20  The report (for such an important issue as the entire contract, and 
dismissal at will for disobedience) is very short, and in it Ellenborough cites no precedents at 
all. It appears there were none in the eighteenth century, and the most recent case on point was 
not helpful to him.  
This was Robinson v Hindman, a lawsuit for wages owing, heard before Lord Kenyon 
in 1800 (3 Esp 235; 170 ER 599; Times 10 Dec 1800). The case was cited in Archbold’s 1811 
edition of Blackstone, and thereafter in justices’ handbooks and in treatises for a quarter of a 
century for the proposition that a servant dismissed without warning would get all the wages 
due at the time of discharge, even if there was misconduct; if there was no misconduct, she or 
he would also deserve a month’s wages beyond those due for actual service. Archbold specifies 
a domestic servant, not one under 5 Eliz c.4, but by 1820 the distinction disappeared, and the 
inclusion of the case in the 1825 edition of Burn thus gave  JPs two different doctrines: 
Ellenborough’s of the entire contract in Spain v Arnott; and Robinson, in which Kenyon was 
cited for what might appear the opposite finding: ‘A master may discharge his servant at a 
moment’s warning for misconduct, (e.g. for being absent when wanted, sleeping from home at 
night without his master’s leave, etc.) and in such case the servant will only be entitled to such 
wages as are due at the time of his discharge.’ (Blackstone 1811: i, 123a n.90; Selwyn 1820: 
ii, 1054; Selwyn 1824: ii, 1090; Selwyn 1827: ii, 1099; Burn 1825: v, 162).  It seems likely 
that Robinson was more appealing to many justices of the peace than the doctrine of the entire 
                                                 
 
 
20 An aspect of the case referred to by counsel in Lilley v Elwin, cited below.  
11 
 
 
 
contract, which could throw families on to the poor rates, to be supported by taxpayers.21 But 
by 1829 Robinson was unimportant: Spain v Arnott was established as the leading authority on 
the entire contract and on the duty of continuous obedience to the master (J. Comyn 1822: v, 
572; S. Comyn 1824: 530; Starkie 1824: iii, 1766; Espinasse 1825: 105; Saunders 1828: ii, 
959; Petersdorff 1829: xii, 611). 
Finally, in Lilley v Elwin (1848) the worker’s offence was part of a collective refusal 
by farm servants in Kent to finish a harvest (11 QB Rep 742; 17 LJR (n.s.) QB 132; 116 ER 
652). They said their customary wage included strong beer, but they got only ‘very bad small 
beer, not so good as water’. Again, the judges at Westminster can be seen to be initiating 
change, or at least powerfully ratifying change being attempted at the local level. The servant 
had originally been dismissed by a justice of the peace, although the men had apparently gone 
to him with the farmer and asked him to mediate their differences. When the servant then sued 
for unpaid wages at Kent spring assizes in 1847, Lord Chief Justice Denman left it to the jury 
to decide whether that dismissal had been justified.22 The jury found for the worker on all the 
issues at trial, apparently accepting the claim that strong beer was a term of such contracts by 
the custom of the country, and that he therefore left work for cause.  
This outcome was what might be expected in ‘traditional’ contract in trial courts: the 
jury decided.23 The recourse to a JP as a mediator in his summary jurisdiction was also 
traditional. And Denman was perhaps particularly likely to leave such a workingman’s case to 
local wisdom. He had represented popular causes when a barrister: Luddite machine-breakers 
and Queen Caroline, the popular estranged wife of the King; as an MP he had supported repeal 
of capital statutes and the abolition of slavery. But he apparently agreed with the other judges 
when the case was reconsidered in Queen’s Bench, although the judgement of the court was 
given by Sir J. T. Coleridge (who had been editor of the Quarterly Review, the major 
Conservative journal, in 1824-5). The judges held that a man hired as a waggoner could be 
considered in law as a servant in husbandry, and therefore expected to work at harvest; they 
also rejected the jury’s finding that it was a wrongful dismissal, as the custom of strong beer 
was not proved. It seems highly likely that Coleridge and the rest of the court thought that 
                                                 
 
 
21 Wages for service were in law due only at the term of the contract, but lay justices (who were charged with a 
broadly equitable jurisdiction) would be encouraged by this statement in Burn to give the equivalent of quantum 
meruit—payment for time actually worked (which we know they did: Hay and Craven, 113n202; Hoseason, 
above; and Hay, unpublished.) 
22 Workers in the 1840s were making significant use of the high courts with the help of radical lawyers: see Frank 
2010.  
23 See Atiyah 1979. 
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strong beer was not compatible with diligent work, however traditional it may have been. It is 
interesting, too, that the ‘ignorant men’ (according to their counsel) apparently first went to the 
JP ‘as a mediator’, who ordered the discharge ‘as the best termination of their differences’ 
without an intention of denying wages.  
This appeal to the mediating JP, like the custom of strong beer, was an image from the 
past: a reality in the eighteenth century, disappearing rapidly in the early nineteenth, and in this 
case utterly repudiated by Queen’s Bench. A discharge from service by a JP was, the court 
held, the equivalent of a dismissal by a master: it necessarily implied misconduct, hence 
mandatory loss of all wages under the doctrine of the entire contract. Their attitudes to 
attentiveness in service, so often expressed in these cases, are also manifest. Wightman J 
suggested that ‘in an ordinary case’ an absence of a few minutes would not be unlawful 
absenting, but Coleridge J instantly disagreed: ‘It might, at a particular time, be a great 
misconduct. For example, the waggoner’s leaving his horses might cause the upsetting of the 
waggon. You cannot maintain that the “misconduct” must be strictly a misfeasance.’  
These cases, with others, constituted a new judicial doctrine that virtually any absence, 
however short, for however pressing a reason, could not trump the command of the master for 
service at that moment. In the background were industrial cases where the exigencies of 
industrial processes motivated similar arguments by industrialists to those of harvesting 
farmers, insisting that their works required a constantly obedient workforce (Hay 2000, 2004: 
95-116; Steinfeld 2001: 39-84; Steinberg 2016: 51-78). Suddenly, over a few decades, the high 
court emphasized in the strongest terms that a command by a master to do anything (virtually 
any lawful and not immoral action) was, simply, to be obeyed.24 And when so many traditional 
contracts of employment relied on understood terms, the exigencies of proving a ‘custom of 
the country’ could be used to discountenance customs of which the judges disapproved. The 
decision in Lilley, combined with statements about unproved custom, could subsequently assist 
                                                 
 
 
24 Deakin 2001: 23 suggests that ‘the statutory context [repeal of settlement in 1834, the master and servant 
statutes] … propelled the common law in the direction of a strict rule against recovery in either contract or 
quantum meruit.’ My argument tends to the opposite conclusion:  that the judges played a major role in initiating 
and ratifying a revivified doctrine of entire contract, long after most master and servant legislation had been passed 
and administered for generations in a very different way, and over a decade before the repeal of settlement by 
hiring in 1834. It is true that repeal of the apprenticeship clauses (1814) and other statutory abrogations of the 
ancien regime emanated from parliament, but the judges had led the way there as well.  
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judges at trial to nonsuit such claims even before they came before the jury, if the custom had 
not been adequately proven in pleadings.25   
In summary hearings magistrates in the eighteenth century might not follow the judges, 
might not even know about recent relevant high court decisions. Thus some magistrates 
continued to ignore the entire contract, giving quantum meruit rulings.26  But as the decades 
passed far better reporting of high court cases in The Times, the spread of organized petty 
sessions with solicitors acting as clerks, and local press reporting of ‘police court’ proceedings 
made judicial doctrine far better known. Ironically, the activity of radical lawyers hired by the 
unions in the 1840s made high court doctrine notorious, and prompted new legislation that 
made it more difficult to contest convictions (Frank 2010). 
 
IV.  Serv ing Time:  The  Impact  of  Penal  Sanct ions  
If the judges wanted to strengthen masters’ powers to intensify work, reduce meal 
times, and insist on instant obedience at any hour of the day or night, did that make any 
difference on the ground: that is, in petty sessions and individual magistrates’ justicing rooms? 
Can we show that state intention (expressed in statutes and case law) actually led to increased 
compulsion? The Imperial evidence suggests that an intensification thesis during this period is 
entirely plausible when new terms are introduced into employment contracts, from both the 
statistical and qualitative evidence (Hay and Craven 2004: passim). It is more difficult to make 
the case for England itself during primary industrialization, at least in statistical terms, largely 
because of the nature of the sources. There are no published statistics before 1858, and so far 
only soundings in the papers of magistrates and petty sessions, where several JPs sat together, 
before that date (Hay 1998, 2000, 2004; King 2006).27 The only longer runs of numbers are 
those of prisoners committed to houses of correction for master and servant offences. 
Unfortunately, most do not begin until the last decade of the eighteenth century, or first decade 
of the nineteenth. They also record only those sentenced to imprisonment, not those workers 
punished by fine or abatement of wages, and of course not the total numbers accused.  
                                                 
 
 
25 This seems to me a close analogy to the ‘on-off’ switch provided by evidence of common employment in the 
doctrine of fellow servant, which similarly enable judges to avoid putting a case before a jury.  
26 Above, note 22. 
27 See also note 39. 
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But the house of correction looms large in enforcement.28 Between 1720 and 1792, ten Acts 
of Parliament specifically provided imprisonment for leaving work and/or misbehaviour.29 
Two of the four earliest ones, in the 1720s, marked an important departure: two and three 
months in the house of correction, rather than the traditional maximum of one month derived 
from one of the clauses in the Statute of Artificers.30 Moreover, almost all the eighteenth-
century master and servant statutes introduced a new requirement that the imprisonment was 
to be with ‘hard labour’;31 and two, an important act of 1747 and another of 1792 added that 
the prisoner, once in the house of correction at hard labour, was there ‘to be corrected.’ That 
is, whipped, as Batterbee was in 1811.32  
The argument for increased coercion rests in large measure on the evidence that the carceral 
capacity of houses of correction greatly expanded in the last decades of the eighteenth century, 
as industrial production suddenly began to rise. Gloucestershire, Staffordshire, and 
Bedfordshire, among other counties, built new and bigger ones. Bedford announced its 
intention to incarcerate more ‘servants in husbandry and other labourers for misbehaviour in 
their employment’ (Hay 2004: 95). The cumulative effect of enactment, combined with the 
cumulative effect of the provision of new places of incarceration, made master and servant law 
much more penal. A week was the common sentence in London bridewell around 1700, with 
or without hard labour and a whipping; most counties outside London lacked accommodation 
for more than a few prisoners. A century later in industrial and agricultural counties the average 
sentence passed, and served, was about a month for most master and servant offences 
(absconding, absence, refusing to work, neglecting work, disorderly apprentices), although 
individual sentences ranged from one week to three months (Hay 2004: 244-47). For the 
offence of refusing to enter into work on an agreed contract, the average sentence served was 
two weeks, probably ended by an agreement to perform. In Gloucestershire two of the four 
houses of correction built in 1791 received increasing numbers of convicts, a high proportion 
of them workers in breach. In seventeen years between 1790 and 1810 there were 835, 32% of 
all cases, an average of 49 a year.33  The increase to 1828 in inmates at  Littledean in the Forest 
                                                 
 
 
28 The following paragraphs draw on Hay 2000. 
29 9 Geo. I c.27 (1722); 12 Geo. I c.34 (1725); 7 Geo. I st. 1 c.13 (1726); 2 Geo. II c.36 (1729); 13 Geo. II c.8 
(1740); 20 Geo. II c.19 (1747); 22 Geo. II c.27 (1749); 6 Geo. III c.25 (1766); 17 Geo. III c.56 (1777); 32 Geo. 
III c.57 (1792).  
30 12 Geo. I c.34 (1725, woollen trade); 7 Geo. I st 1 c.13 (1726, tailors). 
31 6 Geo. III c.25 (1766). 
32 20 Geo. II c.19 (1747); 32 Geo. III c.57 (1792).  
33 Gloucs. R.O., Q/Gli 16/2 (Littledean), Q/Gn4 (Northleach).  Horsley house of correction, in the middle of the 
county’s textile district, probably had a larger population, but records do not survive before 1825. 
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of Dean, a mining and forestry region,  was at least ten times greater than what might be 
expected from population growth.34 A similar pattern can be seen in Staffordshire. In that 
rapidly industrializing county (including the Potteries and much of the emerging Black 
Country), a new house of correction within the new county jail incarcerated 930 men, women, 
and children between between 1792 and 1814 for breach of contract, an average of 40 a year, 
and 39% of all those imprisoned.35 Between 1792 and 1798 master and servant cases in 
Staffordshire never accounted for more than a third of the incarcerations in the house of 
correction, and often far fewer, and the total number ranged between 2 and 23 a year. A marked 
change in 1799, 73 cases, or almost 60% of the total, was thus unusual, but it also was the 
beginning of a longer period of generally higher totals, in which every year except 1801 was 
higher than all the years before 1799, often by a large margin. In some years more workers 
were actually imprisoned for breach than thieves were even prosecuted, let alone convicted 
(Hay 2004: 108-9).36 From the 1820s ‘hard labour’ also meant punishment on the treadmills 
installed in more and more houses of correction. Staffordshire erected its first one in 1822; by 
1834 it had eight (Hay 2000: 246-47; Hay 2004: 106; Greenslade and Johnson 1979: 205).  As 
carceral capacity increased strikes were more easily broken. Master and servant statutes 
penalized leaving work unfinished, and such charges were usually used, rather than the 
Combination Acts.  Multiple charges on the same day in the same trade show how common 
was such use of the law: between a tenth and a fifth of committals to the Stafford house of 
correction between 1792 and 1814 were such (Hay 2000: 257ff).  In 1818 during a Staffordshire 
strike 116 coal miners at Tipton were arrested and sentenced to 2 to 3 months for leaving 
work.37  
An intensification of legal coercion seems clear, although much more work on houses of 
correction and magisterial activity needs to be done to prove beyond doubt that enforcement 
grew much harsher in industries and areas at the heart of industrialisation.   Because of the 
various purposes served by master and servant prosecutions—preventing skilled workers from 
leaving to work for competitors, and breaking strikes; disciplining low-wage female and child 
factory workers to better performance or more intensive effort, and deterring absence or 
                                                 
 
 
34 The population at risk cannot be accurately estimated, but the hundred of St. Briavells, where Littledean house 
of correction was built, had a population increase of 64% between 1801 and 1831; the county population increased 
by 49%. The number of prisoners held for breach of contract in Littledean increased from an average of 1 a year 
1792-1802, about 5 a year to 1811, then an average of 20 a year to 1828, rising as high as 33 in 1825. Wrigley 
2011, tables A1.1, A1.2; Gloucs. R.O.,  Q/Gli 16/2 (Littledean). 
35 Staffs. R.O., D(W) 1723/1, 2. 
36 See below for a post-1858 comparison with vagrancy, begging, and petty larceny by Naidu and Yuchtman 2013. 
37 Staffordshire Advertiser 4 and 11 July 1818.  
16 
 
 
 
absconding—it is unlikely that a rise in master and servant prosecutions will show, in any 
simple way, an intensification of labour. Preventing absconding (unless the new position was 
less work) does not in itself change labour inputs, but it can force workers to fulfil exploitative 
contracts; breaking strikes holds down  the real wage and may thereby force workers to work 
longer hours. Disciplining recalcitrant or absentee lower-wage workers, whether day labourers, 
farm servants, or factory hands, almost certainly does mean intensification. It is probably 
significant that young women working in the new spinning and calico printing mills were 
particularly targeted, and served longer sentences without early release.38  
Prosecutions later in the century suggest a continuing link with industrialization. 
Prosecution patterns in Berkshire and Staffordshire in the period after 1858 show that as the 
first de-industrialized, master and servant cases greatly diminished in magistrates’ caseloads; 
in industrializing Staffordshire they surged (Hay 2000: Fig.6, 261-62).  Analysis of the 
published 1858-1875 statistics has shown that in broad terms, the use of master and servant 
increased during periods of strong economic growth that lead to wage demands, and greatly 
declined in periods of trade depression and unemployment.   (Woods 1982: 93-115; Hay 2000: 
257ff; Steinfeld 2001:72-82; Naidu and Yuchtman 2013: 108, Fig.1c). By this period master 
and servant prosecutions were as common as those for vagrancy and begging, and exceeded 
those for petty larceny.  Closer statistical analysis suggests that employers indeed succeeded in 
suppressing wages in these last decades of the long history of penal sanctions, and it is not 
surprising that repeal was a priority for the trade unions from the 1860s (Naidu and Yuchtman 
2013: 107-8, 112, 131ff). There were also frequent complaints that servants’ claims for wages 
under the statutes were often unsuccessful compared to the mid-eighteenth-century experience 
of workers (Hay 2000: 257).  The economic indicators for the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century are less complete, and without more work on unpublished sources we cannot 
prove by quantitative analysis that the law effectively suppressed wage rates then too, although 
that was one of its avowed purposes.  It will be important to disaggregate individual trades. In 
the industrial Midlands, for example, the effect of war had opposite effects on the iron and 
pottery industries (Hay 1982: 136-37).  Areas with concentrations of particularly high-wage 
skilled industries with a multiplicity of shops (as in the Black Country and the Potteries) 
showed most use of master and servant after 1858 and probably long before, but colliers, poor 
agricultural labourers, women and children in textile factories and skilled farm workers were 
equally kept to their tasks.  By the 1820s it also appears that written contracts were becoming 
common, and abusively used by some  employers to make prosecution easier (Hay 2004: 68, 
                                                 
 
 
38 Madeleine Chartrand, ‘Gendered Justice: Women Workers, Gender, and Master and Servant Law in England, 
1700-1850’, unpublished PhD dissertation, York University (Toronto), September 2017, 389ff. 
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102ff).  A range of petty sessions and other evidence suggests to me that the 1820s to 1840s 
may have been decades of particularly punitive contract enforcement.39 
In a pioneering article Daphne Simon conjectured that the typical industrial employer 
using master and servant at mid-century was a marginal man running a small shop, squeezed 
by bigger competitors (Simon 1954). Staffordshire, with a very high rate of prosecutions from 
1858, was a county of high wages in many of the new industries, but also of small workshops 
where there were probably many marginal employers, competing against precisely such high 
wage competition. But recent work shows that the biggest employers in the Potteries were 
using the penal sanctions as enthusiastically as smaller masters; moreover, they now sat as 
magistrates. Between the 1780s and the 1830s this move of manufacturers onto borough and 
county benches occurred in many industrial areas, and probably contributed greatly to harsher 
application of the penal sanctions. Some eighteenth-century statutes expressly forbade men in 
the woollen trade (long the dominant English industry) from acting as magistrates in master 
and servant disputes, and in most areas of traditional rural industry employment cases were 
heard by landed gentlemen, who were not employers of such labour. This prohibition was not 
repeated in the most important acts after the mid-eighteenth century. The most active 
magistrates in the early decades of the nineteenth century were clerics, with close ties to 
manufacturers as well as gentry. By the 1830s the county bench, and even more often borough 
justices in industrial areas, were highly likely to be masters in the trades whose men they were 
judging on breach of contract charges (Phillips 1977: 48-49, 191; Hay 2000; Hay 2004: 99-
100, 105; Steinberg 2016: 69). 
V.  Conc lus ion  
Was the first industrial revolution the outcome of an ‘industrious revolution’, a 
voluntary self-exploitation by working people wanting more consumer goods? Or the 
consequence of a coerced intensification of labour? If the key to industrialization in Britain 
was either of these, the changes in master and servant law suggest it was the latter.  The longer 
history of master and servant in Scotland was different from that of England, built on a different 
set of laws, with its own forms of intensification. The employment laws of Scotland, which 
was industrializing even more quickly than England, converged with the English pattern by the 
                                                 
 
 
39 I plan to publish this evidence, and hope others will explore more of the manuscript sources to make national 
estimates possible. 
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1820s.40 We also know that master and servant coercion of ‘free’ labour in the British Empire 
after the abolition of slavery was perhaps more exploitative than slavery itself, and coincided 
with the simultaneous growth of industry in England and Britain’s greatest  imperial expansion 
(Hay and Craven 2004: passim and Turner 2004).  
In industrializing England the evidence seems to point clearly to increased coercion of 
workers under master and servant law. Legislation became more punitive. Judges conferred on 
masters the right to fire servants without a magistrate’s approval, and revived the disused 
doctrine of the entire contract. There was a dramatic expansion of capacity in houses of 
correction, sometimes explicitly justified as necessary to control labour, imprisoning 
unprecedented numbers of workers for breach of contract, particularly in industrial areas, and 
intensifying punishment with the treadmill. Finally, the alignment of the magisterial bench with 
masters’ needs by clerical magistrates evolved into dominance of the office of magistrate by 
industrial employers in many parts of the country. So far the evidence suggests that a more 
traditional, paternalist, interpretation and application of the law in the mid-1700s was 
transformed by parliament, judges, magistrates and employers in the years 1750 to 1830, and 
beyond, to help capitalists extract more labour from workers, more cheaply, for greater profits, 
in the first great burst of sustained industrialization in the history of the world. 
  
                                                 
 
 
40 D. Hay, ‘Master and Servant in 18th-century Scotland’, unpublished. Ireland had yet another history, with the 
much-reviled stipendiary magistrates constantly making wage orders on behalf of workers but very rarely (my 
research to date suggests) locking anyone up: Hay, unpublished, given as the Hugh Fitzpatrick Lecture in Legal 
Bibliography, Dublin, Nov 2006. 
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